It is a never-ending battle. Plaintiffs seek new ways to expand liability, and defendants resist and urge courts to hold the line on expanding liability. Recently, the New York Court of Appeals declined an invitation to expand liability to allow recovery for emotional suffering in medical malpractice claims involving in utero injuries to a child born alive. Gerber Ciano Kelly Brady iled an amicus brief on behalf of the Defense Association of New York urging the Court of Appeals to reject expanded liability.
In SanMiguel v. Grimaldi, an expectant mother had been admitted to a hospital and when she did not enter labor by her due date, the doctor and nursing staff induced labor. Two days later, the doctor attempted to deliver the baby but that was unsuccessful. The doctor then performed an emergency C-section delivering the baby alive but in critical condition. The baby suffered brain damage and was taken off life support at 8 days old.
The ultimate issue was whether Court of Appeals’ precedent limiting recovery of purely emotional damages for prenatal torts, as reaffirmed in Sheppard-Mobley v King, applies to medical malpractice claims premised on lack of informed consent. Writing for the majority, Judge Singas held that it did. In response to the demands of plaintiff and the Appellate Division, First Department to overrule Sheppard-Mobley, the majority refused to do so and adhered to its precedent because there had not been significant changes in the last 20 years since Sheppard-Mobley. Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiffs’ cause of action for lack of informed consent.
Plaintiff conceded that she did not suffer any physical injury that would permit recovery under ordinary tort principles. Instead, she argued that (1) Sheppard-Mobley does not bar her claim for purely emotional harm arising from lack of informed consent because it is distinguishable from a traditional medical malpractice claim, and (2) to the extent Sheppard-Mobley bars this claim, it should be overruled. In holding that informed consent and medical malpractice are distinguishable, the Appellate Division ignored the broader context of the general rule barring recovery for purely emotional damages, which long predated Sheppard-Mobley.
Writing for a 4-3 majority, Judge Madeline Singas wrote: “(t)he core question was whether plaintiff’s claim for emotional injuries falls within any exception to that general rule. Because lack of informed consent claims are indistinguishable from traditional medical malpractice claims for purposes of that rule, our holding in Sheppard-Mobley forecloses any argument that the Broadnax exception governs, and our prior cases—reaffirmed in Sheppard-Mobley—confirm that no other exception applies”.
With respect to plaintiff’s demand to overturn precedent, the majority ruled, “because we have not been presented with a sufficient justification to overrule Sheppard-Mobley, we decline plaintiff’s and the Appellate Division’s invitation to do so.”
While it is easy for appellate courts to overrule precedent and expand liability in cases with heartbreaking facts, the Court of Appeals declined to do so and followed its prior precedent. Our team of appellate lawyers at Gerber Ciano Kelly Brady constantly reviews appellate cases to keep our clients abreast with the most recent law.
Should you have any questions, please contact:
